General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemeti, has become, against his will and through the force of events, the ultimate barrier to stopping the spread of international terrorism in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. This man with a very reserved temperament, who is fighting for a return to constitutional legality and sovereignty in his country, now embodies the hope of neighbouring countries and peoples who are watching Sudan get bogged down in unprecedented security chaos, which has become even more complex since the terrorist movements rallied to General Al-Burhan’s junta.
Indeed, since mid-2024, the corrupt government in Khartoum, with the blessing of Washington, Cairo and Istanbul, has benefited from heavyweight support from Islamist movements that have proved their worth in the Syrian theatre. With the terrorist Al Jolani’s seizure of power in the Persian Gulf country serving as a model, international terrorist fighters have been converted into war partners for Al-Burhan’s Sudanese army.
A frightening alliance that has had the merit of raising concerns throughout the Sahel, the most visible signs of which have been the visits by heads of intelligence units from the countries most at risk, including Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. While the purpose of these visits, according to well-informed sources, was to mark the reservations of these states about this unnatural coalition, international supporters of the illegitimate government in Khartoum were quick to present these visits as a sign of vitality for its security diplomacy.
However, powers such as the United States, despite their rapprochement with the junta, denounce this partnership with terrorist movements such as the Islamist brigade Al-Baraa Bin Malik. This brigade, now 20,000 strong and equipped with sophisticated weaponry, had every reason to celebrate the army’s symbolic victory in Khartoum. With no infantry, the army relied on it from the start of the conflict on 15 April 2023, explains military researcher Mohammed Abbas.
‘The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Battalion played a decisive role in the war against the Rapid Support Forces and enabled the army to maintain the armoured corps south of the Sudanese capital against Hemedti’s forces when the attacks intensified between June and August 2023,’ added Abbas.
The Brigade, led by three leaders affiliated to the Islamic movement – Al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha, Anas Omar and Hudhayfah Istanbul – is more than an armed militia, says Mohammed Al-Sunni, a researcher in security and military affairs. It is made up of thousands of young people working in private sector companies, banks and the public sector, » Al-Sunni told a Sudanese media outlet.
‘It would not be unreasonable to classify them as members of the wealthy middle class,’ he added. ‘Given their closeness to the former regime and the benefits they have recently received, either directly or through their families.’
According to Ahmed Khalifa, a researcher specialising in Islamic political movements and jihadist groups, the battalion is capable of intervening between the civil and military institutions of the state. Once the fighting is over, says Khalifa, the battalion will work with state institutions to ensure that the Islamists remain in power. ‘At the end of the war, whatever the scenario, whether it’s an agreement or a military resolution, the members of this group will turn to what they call civilian support,’ said Khalifa. ‘This means empowering the civilian sector, which includes the banking, electricity, oil and utilities sectors.’
Thus, following the Syrian model, the Al-Burhan regime finds itself at the heart of the expansion of terrorist nebulas that are extremely dangerous for the stability of the region and the safety of its people. For the junta, this strategy is vital and seems to be its only option for keeping its illegitimate power intact. To secure their loyalty, it is basing its approach on an assiduous courting of cadres from the former ruling regime, the National Congress Party (NCP) of deposed President Omar al-Bashir.
As a reminder, the NCP is rooted in the Sudanese Islamist movement, which was dominant at the start of the Béchir era in the 1990s, when the country was home to Osama bin Laden, but which has long since abandoned hardline ideology in favour of the accumulation of power and wealth.
The resurgence of the movement could consolidate the reversal of the pro-democracy uprising in Sudan that began in late 2018, while complicating the country’s ties with regional players wary of Islamist influence – not least what explains the hardening of relations with the United Arab Emirates.
In a sign of this trend, several Islamists and their allies have been appointed in recent months to the cabinet of Kamil Idris, the new technocrat Prime Minister appointed in May by the army.
Haroun, one of the Islamist leaders, speaking to Reuters from an electricity-free refuge in northern Sudan, said the NCP envisaged a hybrid government structure in which the army would retain sovereign control ‘until all threats are eliminated’.
Haroun is wanted by the ICC for his alleged involvement in war crimes and genocide in Darfur in the early 2000s – charges he rejects as political.
According to security researcher Al-Sunni, the military government in Port Sudan has already taken new measures to prevent any pro-democracy leader from re-establishing civilian rule.
According to experts, the feeling of frustration is palpable among young people, former members of the pro-democracy movement that helped bring down the old regime, and concern is mounting in the chancelleries of neighbouring countries.
In this context, General Hemeti appears to be a solution to stem the rise of these groups, which are also hostile to him and which threaten both the Sudanese revolution and regional stability. According to political analysts, the presence of these terrorist groups close to the border with the Central African Republic, particularly in localities close to the Vakaga prefecture, which is rich in gold resources coveted by armed gangs of this type, means that forces with converging interests need to be integrated into the country’s security system. The Rapid Support Forces, for example, could provide a suitable solution, given their close links with Russian instructors who are also present in the Central African Republic.
This integrated solution should also involve armies such as those of Chad, Libya, in particular the forces of Marshal Haftar, and South Sudan. A real synergy between these players should make it possible to stem the terrorist threat that threatens the region from Khartoum and Port Sudan.
In return for its increased involvement in this joint security strategy, General Hemeti could then benefit from substantial diplomatic support, making it the interlocutor of choice for a peaceful transition and a return to a democratic and prosperous Sudan. The leaders of the region will only need courage, the same courage that would be needed if the terrorists were to win the war in Sudan, to adopt this bold path of reason.